Iraq Gave Its Militias Until June 2027 to Disarm. The Biggest One Says Talks Have Not Started.

The September 30 deadline for Iraq's armed factions has become a nine-month process with no heavy weapons due back before January. Smaller Iran-aligned groups have signed on, while Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba say no timetable binds them.
Alert analysis
October 15, 2026
Vektora
Alert typePolicy Standoff
Escalation test2 of 5 criteria
Weapons handed overNone reported
Sources28 cited
As of15 Oct 2026
Not met

Military mobilisation

Confirmed force movement beyond routine posture

The coalition left on a schedule agreed in 20241,2. Iraq says it formed a new desert force on the Saudi border3, but no force has moved against the factions.

Met

Formal policy action

Legal change, executive order or regulatory action

The cabinet approved a draft PMF law on 29 September and sent it to parliament4. The prime minister set 30 June 2027 as the end date in a national address on 1 October2.

Not met

Treaty or alliance trigger

A defence pact invoked, or an alliance rupture mechanism used

The coalition mission ended as agreed, and Baghdad says cooperation moves to bilateral agreements2,3.

Met

Economic coercion

Sanctions enacted, blockades, asset freezes (not threatened)

The US Treasury sanctioned networks supporting Kataib Hezbollah on 10 September5.

Not met

Multi-state alignment shift

Sustained coalition formation or diplomatic realignment

Zaidi's visit to Riyadh on 14 October produced no announced agreements6.

Escalation test2 of 5 met · Policy StandoffAn alert needs two criteria met before it calls a crisis

The escalation test from the Vektora alert method, applied to the sources cited under each criterion.

Executive Summary

The ultimatum that ran out on 30 September has been replaced by a slower process that ends on 30 June 2027. Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi announced the new date in a national address on 1 October, the day after the US-led coalition ended its mission7,2. His timetable sets a 90-day halt to attacks from 30 September, followed by a gradual handover of weapons3. The US envoy, Tom Barrack, has called the June 2027 date a shared US-Iraqi understanding8.

The factions are split, and two of the most powerful are holding out. Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada and Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya committed on 1 October to an agreement whose text is not public9,10. Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba, which Al Jazeera describes as among the most powerful, continue to challenge the process11,12. On 15 October Kataib Hezbollah's security chief said negotiations remained at "square one"11. Under the reported terms, surrendered weapons would stay in facilities overseen by the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), not the army13.

What is at stake is whether Iraq can stop its territory being used against its neighbours while US-Iran tensions rise. Iraqi authorities say drones that struck Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline in September were launched from Maysan province3,6. On 14 October Zaidi told Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman that Iraq would not allow such attacks6,14. The test is whether that promise holds through the 90-day halt, which ends in late December.

Alert type
Policy Standoff
two of five escalation criteria met4,5
Deadline for weapons under state control
30 June 2027
moved from 30 September 20267,2
Halt to attacks
90 days
from 30 September, before any handover3
Heavy weapons handed over so far
None reported
handover phase due to start in January, per reported terms13,15
Kataib Hezbollah position
Not bound
talks "at square one", 15 October11,16
01Risk Matrix

Diplomatic and investment risk is high because the weapons stay where they are while Washington and Riyadh watch for attacks; military risk is medium while the halt holds.

MilitaryMediumA partial halt, with an exception for aircraft.

Kataib Hezbollah's leader ordered a stop to military operations on 30 September, except against aircraft the group calls hostile, according to The Insight International, citing the group's media office17. Its security official had threatened to shoot such aircraft down18. Iraqi officials say the factions pledged to honour the 90-day halt19.

DiplomaticHighPromises to Washington and Riyadh now depend on factions Baghdad does not control.

Barrack presented June 2027 as a US-Iraqi understanding8. Washington reportedly considers PMF-run storage not enough13. Zaidi gave Saudi Arabia an assurance on attacks from Iraqi soil14, after drones from Iraq hit a Saudi pipeline in September20.

EconomicMediumSanctions pressure is rising alongside the US campaign against Iran.

The Treasury's 10 September action targeted networks supporting Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq and three other countries5. A US-based analyst warned that American pressure could continue if armed groups keep acting for outside powers3.

ReputationalMediumTwo deadlines have already moved.

Zaidi had called the 30 September deadline final and non-negotiable1. Most Iraqis in an app poll by 964media called disarmament unrealistic3.

InvestmentHighCounterparty exposure to designated groups is wide and hard to see.

Kataib Hezbollah has been a US-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) since 20095. Asaib Ahl al-Haq's political arm holds seats in parliament21, and Kataib Hezbollah controls the Jurf al-Sakhar area south of Baghdad22.

02Forecast Watch

Expect the hardline factions to keep their weapons into 2027 while observing a partial halt, with the PMF law and the January handover start as the next tests.

Confidence on mechanism: high. The positions are on the record: the government's timetable2, the reported terms13,15, and Kataib Hezbollah's refusal to be bound16,11. Confidence on horizon: medium. The outcome depends on talks inside the ruling Coordination Framework whose texts are not public10, and on whether a wider US-Iran confrontation draws the factions back in11.

Analyst assessment. Each call is scored once its date passes.

15%

The Iraqi government or the PMF announces that Kataib Hezbollah has handed heavy weapons (missiles, rockets or attack drones) to state or PMF custody, as reported by the prime minister's media office or 964media.

Settles 30 Jun 2027258 days left
70%

The 30 June 2027 date passes with no announced Kataib Hezbollah handover and no armed clash between Iraqi state forces and Kataib Hezbollah, as reported by 964media, Rudaw or Shafaq News.

Settles 30 Jun 2027258 days left
15%

Iraqi state forces and Kataib Hezbollah fight an armed clash that both sides or the Iraqi government acknowledge, as reported by 964media, Rudaw or Shafaq News.

Settles 30 Jun 2027258 days left

The three calls above form one exclusive set and sum to one. The calls below are separate events and do not sum to one.

Analyst assessment. Each call is scored once its date passes.

30%

The Iraqi government says a drone or missile attack on Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or the Kurdistan Region was launched from Iraqi territory, in an official statement.

Settles 29 Dec 202675 days left
30%

The Iraqi parliament passes the revised PMF law in a final vote, as announced by the parliament's media office.

Settles 31 Dec 202677 days left
45%

The Iraqi government announces the start of weapons collection from the factions under the June 2027 plan, through the prime minister's media office.

Settles 31 Jan 2027108 days left
20%

Kataib Hezbollah publicly states that it accepts the government's timetable or has signed the weapons document with the prime minister, in a statement carried by Rudaw, 964media or its own channels.

Settles 31 Dec 202677 days left
55%

The US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designates an additional Iraqi armed faction leader or PMF-linked company, as listed on its recent actions page.

Settles 31 Dec 202677 days left
  • Kataib Hezbollah and Islamic Resistance in Iraq statements, carried by Rudaw, 964media and Shafaq News, daily, for any acceptance of the timetable or end to the halt.
  • Iraqi parliament agenda and media office, weekly, for a first or second reading of the revised PMF law.
  • Prime minister's media office and Joint Operations Command statements, as issued, for the start of weapons collection and any attribution of attacks from Iraqi soil.
  • OFAC recent actions page, as issued, for new designations of Iraqi factions or PMF-linked firms.
  • Saudi Press Agency, as issued, for reports of drones or missiles launched from Iraq.
  • Institute for the Study of War Iran Update, weekdays, for faction statements and US-Iran escalation that could pull the factions back in.
03The Signal

What moved is the date and the terms, not the weapons: the handover now starts in January, and surrendered arms would stay with the PMF.

This alert covers Iraq's own disarmament process. Our 15 October alert covers the Houthi strikes on Riyadh, which Kataib Hezbollah praised on 12 October3.

Three things changed since August, when the 30 September deadline was presented as final. First, the date moved. Zaidi agreed with Coordination Framework leaders to extend the process to 30 June 2027 before his September visit to the United States, per The New Arab13. Second, the terms softened. Reported details include a new PMF directorate to catalogue faction weapons, storage in PMF facilities, and immunity from prosecution for members who pledge to stop armed activity outside state authority13. Third, the government recast the deadline itself: officials described 30 September as the start of a process rather than an end point1,23.

Regulated, not surrendered. Iraqi politics distinguishes "bringing weapons under state control" (handing them to the state or the PMF) from "regulating" them, which leaves weapons with the factions under agreed rules1. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq describes its talks as being about regulation24. The Institute for the Study of War judges that the agreement smaller factions signed will likely let them keep access to their weapons10.

90 days
Halt to attacks
Jan to Jun 2027
Handover and integration phase
Two
Iran-aligned factions that signed on, 1 October
04What Happened

Baghdad set a hard deadline under US pressure in the summer, then converted it into a staged process as the coalition left and the hardline factions refused to sign on.

Background
Sep 2024
Talks.
Baghdad and Washington agree a two-phase end to the coalition mission, the second phase ending on 30 September 20261.
2 Jun 2026
Announcement.
Asaib Ahl al-Haq forms a committee to separate from the PMF and place its weapons under state control25.
14 Jul
Talks.
Zaidi tells President Trump at the White House there will be no justification for armed factions after 30 September23.
29 Jul
Strike.
US and Saudi air strikes hit PMF positions in seven governorates after drone attacks on Saudi Arabia; Zaidi cancels a visit to Riyadh6.
5 Aug
Announcement.
The ruling State Administration Coalition says armed activity outside the state after 30 September will fall under the counterterrorism law1.
Aug
Talks.
Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani visits Baghdad; a Framework source says his message was no handover at present12.
10 Sep
Sanctions.
The US Treasury sanctions networks supporting Kataib Hezbollah5.
Sep
Strike.
Drones launched from Iraq hit Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline; Zaidi dismisses the Maysan operations commander20,6.
22 Sep
Talks.
After Zaidi meets Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Barrack says the two governments agreed on June 20278,26.
29 Sep
Announcement.
The cabinet approves a draft PMF law and refers it to parliament4.
30 Sep
Announcement.
The coalition mission ends. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq says no timetable binds it; Muqtada al-Sadr dissolves his Promised Day Brigade2,16.
1 Oct
Announcement.
Zaidi sets 30 June 2027 as the end date. Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada backs the agreement on condition others keep their commitments7,9.
14 Oct
Talks.
In Riyadh, Zaidi tells the crown prince Iraq will not be used to launch attacks6.
15 Oct
Announcement.
Latest. Kataib Hezbollah says it has had no official reply on the weapons document and talks are at square one11.
Iraq

Ali al-Zaidi

Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief, Iraq

Set 30 June 2027 as the end date for weapons outside state control and pledged to disarm non-Iraqi armed groups and pass a PMF law2. Had earlier called 30 September final and non-negotiable1.

What to watch
  • Whether weapons collection starts in January
  • Any public reply to Kataib Hezbollah's document
Armed factions

Ahmad al-Hamidawi

Secretary-General, Kataib Hezbollah

Ordered a halt to military operations on 30 September, except against aircraft the group calls hostile, and said there was no deal with Zaidi, per The Insight International17. The State Department offers up to $10 million for information on him25.

What to watch
  • Any end to the partial halt
  • Use of the aircraft exception
Iraq

Muqtada al-Sadr

Shiite cleric, leader of the Sadrist movement

Dissolved his Promised Day Brigade on 30 September and called for all weapons to come under the state, after moving Saraya al-Salam under the commander-in-chief in May3.

What to watch
  • Pressure on rival factions to follow his example
Woodcut portrait of Tom BarrackUnited States

Tom Barrack

US Special Presidential Envoy for Iraq

Said Washington and Baghdad agreed that by the end of June 2027 "only the state is the keeper of the military force"8.

What to watch
  • Whether Washington accepts PMF-run storage
  • New sanctions tied to the timetable
Iran

Esmail Qaani

Commander, Quds Force, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iran

Made an unannounced visit to Baghdad in August; a Coordination Framework source told Al Jazeera that Tehran's message was no handover of faction weapons at the present time12.

What to watch
  • Iranian messaging if US strikes on Iran resume
Woodcut portrait of Mohammed bin SalmanSaudi Arabia

Mohammed bin Salman

Crown Prince and Prime Minister, Saudi Arabia

Received Zaidi in Riyadh on 14 October and reaffirmed Saudi commitment to expanding security cooperation with Iraq14.

What to watch
  • Any Saudi response to a new launch from Iraq
Fig. 1Where the disarmament test plays out
  • Faction areas and launch sites
  • State and coalition positions
  • Where talks happen
BasraMosulNajafIraqIranSaudi ArabiaSyriaTurkey
100 km

Positions are approximate. The border sector marker shows the area the new force covers, not a base. Borders: Natural Earth.

Sources: Rudaw, October 15, 202611; Alhurra (MBN), October 2, 202622; 964media, October 13, 20263; 964media, October 1, 20262; Alhurra (MBN), September 16, 20261

05What's Being Overstated

Neither "Iraq has disarmed the militias" nor "the militias have defied an ultimatum" matches the record; the process is negotiated, staged and only partly accepted.

  • "Iraq issued an ultimatum to the militias." That described August. The current plan is a negotiated timetable with immunity terms, agreed with the ruling bloc13, and the state's own spokesman says most factions responded positively3. The counterterrorism-law threat of 5 August has not been applied1.
  • "Most factions have accepted." The commander-in-chief's spokesman says so3, but two of the most powerful, Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba, have not11,12. Acceptance by smaller groups is conditional on others keeping their commitments9.
  • "Iraq's borders are now fully secured." This is the government's claim19. The September pipeline attack came from Iraqi territory20, and Iraqi intelligence sources cited by Alhurra describe Houthi drone work alongside Iraqi factions; Alhurra could not verify every detail22.
  • "The US withdrawal ends the factions' justification for weapons." That is Baghdad's argument3. The factions add other conditions: the departure of Turkish troops, disarmament of the Kurdish Peshmerga and stronger air defences1,13.
06Why It Matters

The weapons question now decides whether Iraq can keep its promises to Washington and Riyadh while a US-Iran confrontation continues next door.

The disarmament plan has three audiences. Washington set the expectation in June and has tied the date to a US-Iraqi understanding15,8. Riyadh has been hit from Iraqi soil and agreed to hold off a response at Zaidi's request6. Tehran, by the account of a Framework source, told the factions the time was not right to hand over weapons12.

Rising US-Iran tension adds risk. Rudaw reports that the United States is weighing renewed strikes on Iran and that the IRGC has threatened a forceful response, which could draw Iraqi factions back in11. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq reserves the right to respond to any US or Israeli action24.

Some parties rejected the deadline and set conditions, and the government does not have the political consensus needed to move toward an open confrontation
Alhurra (MBN), 16 Sep 20261

Haider al-Shakri, an associate fellow at Chatham House, told Alhurra this in September1. Parliament Speaker Haibat al-Halbousi has also stated the principle without a timetable, saying there are no weapons outside the framework of the law27. Several parties in the ruling Coordination Framework have ties to the factions15, so the enforcement tools the government holds on paper, including the counterterrorism law1, are politically hard to use.

Fig. 2

Is disarming the factions realistic?

Share of respondents to a 964media Qarar app poll, percent

0%20%40%60%60%Agreed disarmament is unrealisticDisagreed

Source: 964media, October 13, 20263

Both figures are given as "about" by 964media. The poll ran on the outlet's own app with 666 respondents, so it is not a representative survey.

07Sector Impact

Exposure is highest where Iraqi business touches PMF-linked companies or the Saudi and Kurdish border areas.

NegativePositiveConditional

Banks and payment firms in Iraq

High

Negative: Sanctions screening risk as Treasury targets Kataib Hezbollah networks

Saudi energy infrastructure

Medium

Conditional: Exposed if launches from Iraq resume after the halt

Air defence and border security suppliers

Medium

Positive: Baghdad plans to buy a complete air-defence system

Construction and trade links with the Gulf

Medium

Conditional: Positive only if the Riyadh assurances hold

Kurdistan Region operators

Medium

Negative: Coalition air cover has gone; Iraqi systems have no delivery date

Zaidi said Iraq would buy a complete air-defence system without naming a supplier, cost or delivery date2. The Kurdistan Region's Peshmerga Ministry said the coalition's departure would leave the region without air defence18.

08Client Implications

Treat June 2027 as a political target, not a compliance date, and screen Iraqi counterparties for links to designated factions now.

ReaderWhat to do
Private equity (PE) and venture capital (VC) firmsMap portfolio exposure to Iraqi partners, suppliers and landlords with PMF or faction links, and to Saudi or Kurdish assets within range of launches from Iraq. Plan on the hardline factions keeping their weapons until at least mid-2027.
Family officesSeparate Iraqi state-linked exposure, where US-Iraqi ties are being rebuilt bilaterally, from exposure to areas controlled by factions. The end of the 90-day halt in late December is the next reference point.
CorporatesRe-check sanctions screening for Iraqi counterparties against OFAC lists, including Kataib Hezbollah support networks. Keep security plans in the Kurdistan Region and southern border areas on the assumption that air defence is thin.
Law firmsAdvise that reported immunity terms and PMF-held storage may not satisfy US demands. Review sanctions and anti-terrorism-finance clauses in Iraqi contracts, and diligence beneficial owners of firms near PMF structures.
09Due Diligence Questions

The useful questions test a counterparty's distance from the factions and its plan if the halt ends.

  • Ownership: Does any shareholder, director or major customer have links to the PMF, Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba or Asaib Ahl al-Haq?
  • Sanctions: When was the counterparty last screened against OFAC designations, and does screening cover the networks named on 10 September?
  • Location: Do sites or routes pass through areas controlled by armed factions, such as Jurf al-Sakhar, or near the Saudi border?
  • Security: What is the plan for staff and assets in the Kurdistan Region now that coalition air defence has left?
  • Contracts: Do contracts carry termination or force majeure rights if new US sanctions hit an Iraqi partner?
10Vektora Assessment

Baghdad is likely to win a partial halt and a paper process, not the surrender of Kataib Hezbollah's heavy weapons, by June 2027.

Confidence: medium. This assessment rests on 28 sources, including statements by the Iraqi prime minister's office, the US Treasury, the Iraqi cabinet and the factions themselves, and reporting by Iraqi, Gulf, Iranian and US outlets. The extension and its terms rest mainly on unnamed government and Framework sources cited by The New Arab and Alhurra13,15; the US envoy's comments and the prime minister's address corroborate the date8,2.

Primary assessment. The government has chosen a negotiated process over confrontation because it lacks the political consensus to use force1. Factions that already sit inside the political system have accepted it on conditions9,25. Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba have not, and their leaders frame the weapons as the guarantee against US and Israeli action24,17. The likely result by June 2027 is a catalogued arsenal under PMF supervision, which the Institute for the Study of War judges would not meet US demands10.

Strongest alternative reading. The process may work better than its critics expect. The coalition's departure removed the main justification for the weapons3. Sadr has dissolved his last armed unit3, Asaib Ahl al-Haq began separating from the PMF in June25, and a Framework member told The New Arab: "Everyone will ultimately hand over the weapons"13. On this reading, Kataib Hezbollah's statements are bargaining over terms, not refusal.

Where we diverge from consensus. Much coverage treats the outcome as a test of Zaidi's will. The record points to the Coordination Framework as the decision-maker. The head of the judiciary told the US chargé d'affaires that the weapons programme would follow a Framework plan, not a government one23. Watch the Framework's four-member committee (Zaidi, former prime minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, Badr leader Hadi al-Amiri and Nouri al-Maliki) more than the prime minister's deadlines1.

  • What would make this wrong: Kataib Hezbollah signing the weapons document and handing over missiles or drones early in 2027, which would point to a deal with Tehran's backing.
  • Or: a renewed US-Iran war that ends the halt, which would make an armed clash more likely than a negotiated delay11.
11Appendix: Deep Background

The current process grew out of the 2026 Iran war, a US demand for a timetable and a coalition exit agreed in 2024.

After the regional war began in late February, Iran-aligned factions carried out repeated drone, rocket and missile attacks on US targets in Iraq. The United States struck PMF-linked positions in return25. Washington asked Baghdad in June for a clear timetable to bring weapons under state control15. Zaidi took office on 14 May with US backing21,15.

The PMF is a state-funded umbrella of mostly Shiite armed groups and formally part of Iraq's armed forces, but its most powerful factions operate largely outside the military chain of command15. A revised PMF law would restrict its movement and keep it away from cities, while leaving it an independent institution reporting to the prime minister28. An earlier draft failed in parliament after US objections28.

The US-Saudi strikes of 29 July killed at least 20 PMF members and wounded 32, according to preliminary PMF figures6. Washington designated Kataib Hezbollah a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 20095. In the November 2025 election, Asaib Ahl al-Haq's political arm, Sadiqoon, won 28 seats21. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies argued in June that such groups are likely making cosmetic rather than substantive reforms21.

only the state is the keeper of the military force

964media8

Iran's state broadcaster presents the factions' case: Press TV carried the Islamic Resistance statement that the US withdrawal followed "painful blows" and that its weapons would remain with its fighters24. The IRGC called the withdrawal a historic victory7.

12Sources
  1. Iraq Backs Away From Deadline to Disarm Armed Factions. Alhurra (MBN), September 16, 2026
  2. Zaidi pledges to disarm non-Iraqi armed groups as coalition mission ends. 964media, October 1, 2026
  3. Most factions have responded positively to 2027 weapons deadline, Numan says. 964media, October 13, 2026
  4. Iraqi government votes on PMF law. Shafaq News, September 29, 2026
  5. Operation Economic Outcast Strikes Iran's Global Terrorist Proxy Network. US Department of the Treasury, September 10, 2026
  6. Iraq won't let its territory be used for attacks, Zaidi tells Saudi crown prince. 964media, October 14, 2026
  7. Iraqi PM sets June 30 deadline for pro-Iran factions to disarm as US coalition withdraws. i24NEWS, October 1, 2026
  8. US envoy says Washington and Baghdad agreed June 2027 deadline on weapons. 964media, September 22, 2026
  9. Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada backs PM's weapons pledge. Shafaq News via Hatha Alyoum, October 1, 2026
  10. Iran Update, October 2, 2026. Institute for the Study of War and Critical Threats Project, October 2, 2026
  11. Pro-Iran armed group says Iraq weapons agreement still at 'square one'. Rudaw, October 15, 2026
  12. Top Iranian commander visited Iraq to discuss disarmament plan: Source. Al Jazeera, August 12, 2026
  13. Exclusive: Iraq extends armed groups disarmament deadline to June 2027. The New Arab, September 22, 2026
  14. Iraq will not become a launchpad for attacks on Saudi Arabia, vows prime minister. Arab News, October 14, 2026
  15. Iraqi Government Reaches Agreement With Factions on Weapons. Alhurra (MBN), September 22, 2026
  16. Pro-Iran Iraqi factions say they are 'not bound by any timeline or agreement' on weapons. Middle East Monitor, October 1, 2026
  17. Kataib Hezbollah suspends military operations but keeps right to target aircraft. The Insight International, October 1, 2026
  18. Kataib Hezbollah threatens to bring down Zaidi's government and shoot down hostile aircraft after Sept. 30. 964media, September 29, 2026
  19. MERI 2026: Iraqi military vows to bring arms under state control. Shafaq News, October 13, 2026
  20. Attack on key Saudi pipeline is blamed on Iran-backed militias in Iraq. Associated Press (via ABC7), September 12, 2026
  21. Voluntary Militia Disarmament in Iraq Sounds Too Good to Be True, and It Likely Is. Foundation for Defense of Democracies, June 3, 2026
  22. Exclusive: Houthis Embedded with Iran-Backed Militias Across Iraq, Intelligence Sources Say. Alhurra (MBN), October 2, 2026
  23. US envoy says Washington backs an Iraq with no arms outside state authority. 964media, September 14, 2026
  24. Iraqi resistance vows to keep arms, says US forces withdraw after 'painful blows'. Press TV, September 30, 2026
  25. Asaib Ahl al-Haq forms 'committee' to separate from PMF, hand weapons to state. 964media, June 2, 2026
  26. Iraqi-American Understanding on 'Disarmament' by Mid-2027. Asharq Al-Awsat, September 23, 2026
  27. Iraq's speaker of parliament calls for 'no weapons outside the law'. 964media, September 30, 2026
  28. Exclusive: Iraq revises Popular Mobilisation Forces law to curb powers after US objections. The New Arab, October 7, 2026