Hormuz Is Open for Oil and Shut for Gas. Europe's Winter Pays the Bill.

Crude is leaving the Gulf at about half its pre-war rate through the Strait, but gas and refined products are not coming back.

Before the war, about 20 million barrels a day of oil passed through the Strait of Hormuz: about a fifth of world petroleum consumption and more than a quarter of seaborne oil trade⁴. About a fifth of the world's trade in liquefied natural gas passed the same way, and most of both went to Asia: 84% of the crude and 83% of the LNG⁴.

The flow collapsed in the spring. The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) puts flows through the Strait at 21.6 million barrels a day in the last quarter of 2025 and 4.9 million in the second quarter of 2026¹. By 11 March exports through the Strait were below 10% of their pre-conflict level¹⁶. That day the 32 members of the International Energy Agency (IEA) agreed to release 400 million barrels from emergency stocks, the largest release in their history¹⁶.

September brought much of the crude back. The IEA puts September flows through the Strait at 10.9 million barrels a day, with Gulf crude exports at 13.9 million barrels a day, over 75% of pre-war levels³. Pipelines that carry oil around the Strait did much of the work: exports through them rose to 5.6 million barrels a day³. Lloyd's List counted at least 477 transits by ships not linked to Iran in September, the most since the war began¹⁷.

Gas and refined products did not come back. Middle East exports of refined products were 1.9 million barrels a day in September against 4.7 million before the war, and liquefied petroleum gas was at less than half its pre-war level³. Kpler counted 21 LNG cargoes leaving the Strait in September, up from 15 in June; S&P Global's analyst said the pace could reach about a quarter of pre-war levels in October¹⁸.

October went backwards. Kpler data cited by Al Jazeera show 20.8 million barrels passing through the Strait on 8 October and 2.9 million on 11 October¹⁹. Lloyd's List recorded at least 13 attacks on tankers or gas carriers since 28 September¹⁷.

Trackers disagree because they count different things. Lloyd's List and Kpler count ships and cargoes, including those that cross with their transponders switched off. IMF PortWatch counts transponder signals only, and recorded one commercial transit on 16 August against a pre-crisis median of about 73 a day²⁰. In this report, flows are the IEA's and transits are Lloyd's List's.

The physical barrel trades far above the Brent futures contract most hedges are written against, and the official forecasts sit far apart.

Brent futures closed at $108.97 a barrel on 20 October²¹. The physical North Sea price, Dated Brent, averaged $116.89 in September and traded near $134 when the IEA wrote its October report³. Diesel reached all-time highs of about $220 a barrel in Europe and the United States³. A company that hedged physical crude or diesel with Brent futures has carried that gap.

Dated Brent was $71.32 on 27 February, the day before the war began, and peaked at $138.21 in the second week of April²². Futures peaked at $126.41 intraday on 30 April²³. After the June memorandum Dated Brent fell below its pre-war level, then climbed back to $135.51 on 2 October as attacks resumed²².

Official forecasts sit far apart, and each assumed an earlier reopening than has happened. The EIA's October outlook has Brent averaging $105 in the fourth quarter and $96 for 2026²⁴. The European Central Bank (ECB), working from futures prices to 19 August, assumed $89.5 for 2026²⁵. Its severe scenario has oil near $130 and gas at 130 euros per megawatt hour in the fourth quarter, with euro area inflation peaking at 5.4% in 2027²⁵. The IMF assumes an average crude price of $95.74 for 2026¹³.

The Gulf's LNG loss is concentrated in Qatar and lands on a Europe entering winter with the emptiest stores on record and a Russian LNG ban due on 1 January.

The IEA expects LNG supply from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates to fall about 45% this year, about 54 billion cubic metres (bcm)⁵. The world as a whole lost far less: global LNG output fell 4% from March to June, because other producers covered about three quarters of the Gulf loss⁵. The IEA's forecast assumed the Strait would fully reopen in the third quarter of 2026⁵, which did not happen. Each month without LNG cargoes through the Strait costs about 10 bcm of supply²⁶.

The Dutch TTF benchmark settled at 86.64 euros per megawatt hour on 20 October, up 169% on a year earlier, after topping 88 euros on 19 October, the highest since December 2022⁶. In February it was closer to 32 euros²⁷.

Europe's stores were 74.6% full on 19 October, against 82.8% a year earlier and a five-year average of 89.2%⁷. The gas grid operators' winter outlook sees a shortfall of 12% to 15% of demand if a severe cold snap meets a disruption of Russian supply and a tight LNG market²⁸. IEEFA estimates the EU may need to use 7% less gas than last winter²⁹. Filling the gap with imports instead would cost about 3 billion euros, 12% more than the same volume cost last year²⁹.

Two dates tighten it. QatarEnergy has extended force majeure on LNG deliveries through November, and for Italy's Edison into early December; Edison says as many as 35 cargoes have not reached Italy this year³⁰. And from 1 January 2027 the EU's ban on Russian LNG applies to long-term contracts as well¹².

Crude tankers earn record rates while LNG ships earn less than before the war, and war-risk cover swings with every attack and truce without making underwriters money.

Crude shipping is the war's clearest winner. On 15 October the benchmark route for a very large crude carrier from the Gulf to China paid a round-trip $1,412,594 a day³¹. Frontline, one of the largest tanker owners, reported its best quarterly profit ever, $659.2 million, in the second quarter³².

LNG shipping is the opposite. Spark's Atlantic charter rate was $25,750 a day on 6 October, 91% below its early-March peak of $287,500 and below the $42,750 it stood at just before the war³³. With Qatari cargoes trapped and new ships delivered, there are more LNG carriers than cargoes. For gas buyers the pain is the price of the gas, not the cost of moving it.

War-risk insurance never disappeared; its price moved with each attack and truce. Before the war, Gulf trips paid 0.15% to 0.25% of a ship's hull value. On 10 March most Hormuz transits paid 2.5%, ships with US, UK or Israeli links 5%, and high-risk business was quoted at 7.5%³⁴. Rates fell to about 2% after the June memorandum and rose to about 5% in July³⁵. Marsh put them at 7.5% to 10% on 22 July³⁶. In late August they were 3% to 8%²⁰, and in October brokers put tanker premiums at 6% to 10% of hull value⁸.

The Joint War Committee lists the areas where underwriters charge extra for war risk³⁷. It will not take the Gulf off its list without sustained incident-free passage, a settled geopolitical picture and formal proof that mines have been cleared²⁰.

Higher rates are paying for losses, not producing a windfall. Beazley's profit before tax fell 52.7% to $237.7 million in the first half³⁸, and its chief executive named the political violence and marine war books³⁹. The broker Howden Re estimated the war could generate $2 billion to $3 billion of war, terror and political violence claims⁴⁰. The US government's $40 billion reinsurance facility had written no business by mid-May, because it covers only ships under US naval escort⁴¹.

Crude shippers, US gas exporters, Saudi Arabia and Europe's refiners are earning from the war; Qatar, European industry and import-dependent Asia are paying for it.

US LNG exporters gain from the gap between American and European gas prices. Cheniere's net income was $3,068 million in the second quarter against $1,626 million a year earlier, and it raised its full-year guidance⁴². Saudi Arabia gains on price: Aramco's adjusted net income was $33.4 billion in the second quarter, with the East-West pipeline carrying exports away from the Strait⁴³.

Qatar is the largest single loser. It lost about $24 billion of LNG sales in the first six months, shipping 18 cargoes against 509 a year earlier⁴⁴. On 19 October its deputy prime minister said transit fees "should not be applied" and that "We haven't reached the peak with respect to energy"⁴⁵.

Two expected winners are not. Russia's oil and gas budget revenue fell 22% year on year in September, to 452.4 billion roubles⁴⁶. China's imports of Iranian crude through the Strait fell 48% below pre-war levels in July and August, according to Kpler⁴⁷, which gives Beijing a reason to want the Strait reopened.

Importers pay. Japan's trade deficit was 1.106 trillion yen in August against 294.1 billion yen a year earlier, with crude imports up 58.7% and LNG imports up 29.7%⁴⁸. In Europe, chemical plants ran at 75% of capacity⁴⁹.

The legal exposure operators most underestimate is not the war peril but sanctions contamination of the voyage, which can void cover after the fact.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) says payments to, and guarantees from, Iran's government or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) for passage are not authorised⁹. The rule covers US persons, US banks and the foreign companies they own or control⁹. Its alert of 24 August extended the risk to accepting Iranian insurance or answering Iran's information demands, even when nothing is paid⁵⁰.

Europe followed. Since 8 June the EU lists the IRGC Navy's Hormozgan Provincial Command, which runs the screening and toll system, so an EU operator that pays risks breaching the asset freeze¹⁰. On 8 October OFAC designated 17 vessels and 17 companies and warned foreign banks they could lose access to US correspondent accounts⁵¹.

Insurers have their own trigger. Shipowners' mutual insurers end cover where business becomes sanctionable, so a voyage that paid the toll may have no claims paid on it¹¹. That exposure runs back up the chain to cargo buyers, lenders and insurers who cannot see what a ship did in transit.

Contracts shift the war loss to the charterer. Under the standard war clause, owners may refuse any area where, in their reasonable judgement, the ship may be exposed to war risks, and it "appears highly likely" they need not transit Hormuz⁵². War cover itself was cancelled on 72 hours' notice: Gard's cancellation took effect on 5 March, with cover reinstated outside Iran, the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman⁵³.

The Russian LNG ban carries heavy penalties and a stated position on contracts. Member states must allow fines for a company of at least 40 million euros, or a share of its worldwide turnover or of the transaction's value¹². The EU calls the ban "a sovereign act of the Union beyond the control of gas importers"¹².

A signed truce is not a safe passage: the path back runs through mine clearance, escorts, crews and the insurers' list, and gas returns after crude.

The diplomacy has no date. Iran's foreign minister says the Strait would reopen on the sixth day of his plan and talks would begin on the seventh⁶¹. His terms are an end to the US naval blockade, relief from oil sanctions and a ceasefire on all fronts⁶¹.

Iran

Abbas Araghchi

Foreign Minister of Iran

Sets Iran's terms: the Strait reopens on the sixth day of his plan, after an end to the US blockade, oil sanctions relief and a ceasefire on all fronts⁶¹.

What to watch

• Any date attached to the plan's first day
• Whether the US answers the blockade demand

United States

Brad Cooper

Commander, US Central Command

Said in late August that US forces had cleared Iranian mines from the transit routes⁶²; his command escorted up to 40 vessels in one day on 1 September⁵⁶.

What to watch

• Independent confirmation of mine clearance that insurers accept
• How many ships a day escorts sustain

Qatar

Saad Sherida al-Kaabi

Qatar's Minister of State for Energy Affairs

Says Qatar's LNG could return to normal within a couple of weeks of reopening, apart from the two damaged trains¹⁵.

What to watch

• QatarEnergy's monthly force-majeure notice
• The weekly count of LNG carriers leaving the Strait

Portraits after photographs. Abbas Araghchi: IAEA Imagebank, via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 2.0; Saad Sherida al-Kaabi: Press Service of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 4.0.

Mine clearance is now a question of proof. The commander of US Central Command said in late August that US forces had cleared Iranian mines from the transit routes⁶². Iran's deputy foreign minister replied that "no one except Iran knows the locations of these mines"⁶², and US allies believe the Strait is likely still mined⁶³. The US retired its last four Gulf minesweepers in September 2025⁶⁴.

Escorts can surge crude but cannot run a normal day. Experts told Lloyd's List in March that escorts would cap tanker transits at just under 10% of normal volumes⁶⁵. Yet on 1 September the US escorted up to 40 vessels carrying about 18 million barrels⁵⁶. Crews may refuse to sail into the area, which seafarers' unions and employers designated a warlike operations area on 6 March⁶⁶.

Gas comes back after crude. Qatar's energy minister says LNG could return to normal "within a couple of weeks" of reopening¹⁵. That excludes the 17% of exports lost with two damaged trains, which may take up to five years to repair¹⁵. A source at QatarEnergy said in June that the bottleneck would be bringing ships in and loading them, with shippers asking for assurances that mines were cleared⁶⁷.

Cover comes back last. War-risk premiums fell from about 5% to about 2% within six days of the June truce⁶⁸, and never went lower before attacks resumed. After the Red Sea ceasefire of October 2025, premiums took about two months to fall from 0.5% to around 0.2% of hull value⁶⁹.

History says the premium and the price spike are not new; the volume lost is. War-risk rates for trips to Kharg reached 7.5% in May 1984⁷⁰, yet the Tanker War never disrupted more than 2% of the ships passing through the Gulf⁷¹. In 1990 oil went from about $17 a barrel in June to $40 in mid-October and back to about $20 after Desert Storm began⁷². When supply was physically withdrawn in 1973, the price went from $3 to almost $12 a barrel and stayed high⁷³.

Our scenario run on Europe's year-end gas price finds no path back to a calm market before January, and splits on whether a new shock arrives.

We put the question that carries the most money for this winter through Vektora's scenario method: where the Dutch TTF front-month contract settles on 31 December 2026⁷⁴. The run played out twelve worlds against three price bands: calm below 65 euros per megawatt hour, strained from 65 to 95, and severe above 95⁷⁴.

None of the twelve worlds lands in the calm band⁷⁴. Most of the worlds assume a catalyst happens, such as a new strike on Gulf supply, a cold snap or a breakdown in European coordination. They show where those shocks lead, not how likely they are. The run's ordinary path, where the standoff simply continues, settles in the low to mid 70s, and in the mid to upper 80s if Europe's brakes on demand keep working⁷⁴.

The market sits near the ordinary path. ICE settlements on 29 September priced the winter 2026/27 strip at 68.77 euros⁷⁵, and the front month settled at 86.64 euros on 20 October⁶. The brief for this run, with every world, its reasoning and its signposts, is at vektora.md/briefs/ttf-year-end.

• Whether the front-month contract settles at or above 78 euros on 6 November, which ten of the twelve worlds expect⁷⁴.
• Whether the first-quarter 2027 contract settles at or above 90 euros on 16 November, which ten of the twelve worlds expect⁷⁴.
• Whether Lloyd's List reports no new tanker attack in the Strait between 21 October and 23 November, which nine of the twelve worlds expect⁷⁴.
• Whether EU storage is below 75% in the week ending 20 November, which only four of the twelve worlds expect⁷⁴.

A truce helps oil buyers within weeks, gas buyers within months and insurers last, while a wider war hits every reader at once.

The strongest case against this report is that the market has already adapted and that a truce would unwind the shock faster than we allow.

The case is real. Crude has largely found its way out: Gulf crude exports reached over 75% of pre-war levels in September³. The world lost far less LNG than the Gulf did, because other producers covered about three quarters of the Gulf loss⁵. US exporters shipped 10.9 million tonnes of LNG in September, 54% of it to Europe³³. The IMF reads futures as pointing to a gradual return of flows from early 2027¹³.

History supports it too. In 1990 oil fell back to about $20 a barrel soon after Desert Storm began⁷². In this war Dated Brent fell below its pre-war level within weeks of the June memorandum²², and war-risk premiums fell from about 5% to about 2% within six days of it⁶⁸.

Our reply is that the adaptation is in oil, and the exposure is in gas. Europe enters winter with stores far below their five-year average⁷, the Russian LNG ban tightens supply on 1 January¹², and Qatar's minister says two damaged trains are out for years¹⁵. The June truce that drove the fastest unwind collapsed within weeks¹⁴. A truce now would ease prices, but it would arrive after this winter's buying decisions are made.

Buy winter gas cover and price war risk voyage by voyage now; keep both until Qatari LNG is moving through the Strait in volume after a truce that holds.

Confidence: medium. The mechanism is well documented: the shock sits in gas, refined products and insurance, not in crude, and every official forecast assumed a reopening that has slipped. Confidence on timing is lower, because the war's end depends on talks with no fixed date.

Where we differ from the consensus. The futures curve, the IMF and the ECB all price a war that fades in 2027. We think that understates the time from a signed truce to normal trade. Mine clearance has to satisfy insurers, crews can refuse the area, and Qatar's own estimate leaves part of its capacity out for years.

What would change the call. Qatari LNG seen moving through the Strait in volume, after weeks with no merchant ship lost. That is what cut war-risk rates in 1991⁷⁶ and, briefly, in June 2026⁶⁸.

Our dated calls: a year-end gas price in the strained band, Qatari force majeure into December, and no early return of the Gulf to normal insurance terms.

Confidence on the mechanism is high: the supply loss is in Qatari LNG, and Europe's stores are low. Confidence on the horizon is medium, because a truce could come at any time. The first three calls are one set and sum to one; the last three stand alone.

Analyst assessment. Each call is scored once its date passes.

Act on gas and insurance now, and on contracts and disclosure before the year-end accounts.

• European gas buyers and utilities: buy winter and first-quarter 2027 cover now, sized for stores near three quarters full and the 1 January Russian LNG step. Watch the weekly count of LNG carriers leaving the Strait, not transponder trackers.
• Energy traders and refiners: hedge physical crude and diesel against physical or product prices, not Brent futures alone. The gap between the two has been the largest single cost of the war for physical holders.
• Shipowners and charterers: price war risk voyage by voyage and keep it out of annual terms. Write a no-toll, no-Iranian-cover, no-information-response rule into every charter and cargo contract that touches the Gulf, and ask counterparties to warrant it.
• Marine and war-risk insurers: expect premiums to fall fast on a truce and then stall; do not price a return to pre-war terms until passage has stayed safe for months and the listing changes.
• Corporates with Gulf or European exposure: prepare the geopolitical-risk disclosure for 2026 accounts now, and test supply contracts for how force majeure and sanctions clauses interact if the war widens.

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