Gulf pipelines can carry at most 5.5 million barrels a day around Hormuz, against about 20 million before the war

Saudi and Emirati expansions arrive in 2027 or later, and Qatar's gas has no pipeline route at all.
Analysis
November 8th, 2026
Vektora
Hormuz oil flowDisrupted
Qatari LNG bypassNone
Sources7 cited
As ofNov 8th, 2026
8.44million barrels a day
-49% from FebruarySeaborne crude exports from Gulf states excluding Iran in March 2026, down from 16.58 million barrels a day in February1.
05101520IEA ceiling for bypass pipelines, 5.58.44FebruaryMarch

Sources: Ynet, April 5th, 20261; International Energy Agency, November 8th, 20262

Executive Summary

Pipelines that avoid the Strait of Hormuz can carry an estimated 3.5 million to 5.5 million barrels a day, the International Energy Agency (IEA) says2. Hormuz is the narrow waterway at the mouth of the Persian Gulf. Only Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have operating crude pipelines that skip it2. About 20 million barrels a day of oil and products passed through the strait before the war3.

Oil can be rerouted. Gas mostly cannot. The Israeli research institute INSS says there is currently no alternative route for Qatari liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports4. QatarEnergy, the state-owned Qatari producer, has instead signed a 20-year deal for up to 3 million metric tons a year of US LNG, with deliveries expected from 20305.

The projects that would shrink Hormuz's weight mostly finish in 2027 or later. Abu Dhabi says it is working to double its Fujairah pipeline, which could allow over 3 million barrels a day in 20274. Saudi Arabia's Singapore oil storage is expected to start in the second half of 20275. For this winter, the strait still sets the price.

Bypass pipeline capacity (IEA)
3.5 to 5.5 million b/d
Hormuz oil flow before the war
about 20 million b/d
Gulf crude exports, March 2026
8.44 million b/d
Fujairah pipeline after expansion
over 3 million b/d, 2027
01The Gap in Numbers

Pipelines that skip Hormuz cover a fraction of what the strait carried.

The war on Iran began in late February 2026 and shipping through the strait has been disrupted since.

The IEA puts available bypass capacity at 3.5 million to 5.5 million barrels a day2. Before the war, about 20 million barrels a day of oil and petroleum products moved through the strait3. The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) put pre-war crude alone at roughly 21 million barrels a day. It said traffic fell to about 4.9 million barrels a day in the second quarter of 2026, as INSS reports4.

Fig. 1

Hormuz traffic against the bypass ceiling

Million barrels a day

01020305.5Bypass pipeline ceiling (IEA)

Source: Institute for National Security Studies, September 16th, 20264

The EIA figures are reported by INSS4. The IEA ceiling is from2.

Actual exports show the same gap. Seaborne crude exports from Gulf states excluding Iran fell to 8.44 million barrels a day in March, a 49% drop from 16.58 million in February, according to figures reported by Ynet1. Saudi Arabia exported 4.388 million barrels a day and the UAE 2.132 million. Iraq fell to 561,000, Kuwait to 280,000 and Qatar to 135,0001. Oman, which sits outside the strait, rose to 940,0001.

02What Each Route Can Carry

The biggest route is Saudi Arabia's; the rest are small, damaged or still on paper.

Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline can carry up to 7 million barrels a day to Yanbu on the Red Sea, of which up to 5 million can be exported from there6. The UAE's Habshan-Fujairah pipeline carries up to 1.5 million barrels a day to a port outside the strait6. INSS puts its current capacity at 1.5 million to 1.8 million and says Abu Dhabi is working to double it4.

Both routes have been hit. Iran attacked the East-West pipeline in April, cutting throughput by roughly 700,000 barrels a day, CNBC reported3. Iranian drones also struck the port of Fujairah, where the UAE pipeline ends3.

Fig. 2

Nominal capacity of oil routes that avoid Hormuz

Million barrels a day. Routes overlap and are not additive.

Source: International Crisis Group, June 2nd, 20266

SUMED and Basra-Haditha capacities are from INSS4; the others are from the International Crisis Group6.

Saudi oil sent to Yanbu then faces another chokepoint. INSS says that route increased exposure to Bab al-Mandab, the strait at the southern end of the Red Sea, where a Houthi blockade exists4. The Houthis are an armed movement in Yemen.

03Three Projects With Dates

Each named project finishes after this winter.

  • QatarEnergy, the Qatari state energy company, announced a 20-year agreement for up to 3 million metric tons of LNG a year from Woodside Energy's Louisiana LNG project, with deliveries expected from 20305.
  • LNG Canada, a gas export plant at Kitimat, British Columbia, approved Phase 2 in September, which will double capacity from 14 million to 28 million metric tons a year5.
  • Saudi Arabia and Singapore announced on October 26th plans for a crude oil storage arrangement at Singapore's Jurong Rock Caverns, with operations expected in the second half of 20275.

None of the three adds a barrel through the Gulf. They move supply, or storage, to places the strait cannot reach.

04Why Oil and Gas Split

Gas buyers have no pipeline to fall back on, so they are paying in price.

Qatar ships virtually all of its LNG through the strait, and LNG cannot be sent down an existing oil pipeline5. Europe's benchmark gas price rose above €100 per megawatt-hour in late October, the first time since 2022, as traders weighed Middle Eastern LNG disruptions, colder weather and tighter storage5.

Sultan Al Jaber, chief executive of the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), said on November 2nd that some regions face an LNG supply gap of 600 billion cubic feet7. He also said shipping and logistics now make up 30% of the cost of a barrel, up from 5% before the war7.

05The Other Reading

The optimists say pipelines will make the strait worthless within years; the record so far does not support that for gas.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said in September that the strait would become worthless within two years as Gulf states redirect energy exports through overland pipelines, INSS notes4. Georges Elhedery, chief executive of the bank HSBC, suggested alternative routes could make Hormuz largely redundant for oil within five years, according to Shale magazine5.

The case is strongest for oil and weakest for gas. The Shale magazine columnist calls the five-year claim probably too strong because LNG depends much more on the strait5. Ynet's analysis goes further and concludes that Hormuz is irreplaceable, because the workarounds cut volume and raise cost1. INSS argues the goal should be redundancy, not replacement4.

06Vektora Assessment

Bypass pipelines will lower Hormuz's weight for oil over several years, but not this winter and not for Qatari gas.

Confidence is medium. The mechanism is well documented: capacity figures come from the IEA and from two independent research institutes2,4,6. The timing is less certain, because the key expansion dates come from announcements, and Iran has already shown it can hit these routes3.

The strongest alternative reading is that insurers and buyers price expectations, so announcements could move war-risk costs before pipes carry oil. We found no source that shows this has happened yet. What would change the view: a firm completion date for the Fujairah doubling, a Saudi-Omani pipeline decision (proposals reach up to 7 million barrels a day4), or a second export route for Qatari gas.

07Client Implications

Plan for oil routes to improve slowly and for gas exposure to persist.

  • Energy traders and funds: treat 2027 as the earliest date by which Fujairah capacity could pass 3 million barrels a day4, and keep Hormuz risk in winter positions.
  • Corporates buying LNG: contracts from US and Canadian projects reduce strait exposure only from 2030 for the Woodside deal5.
  • Insurers and lawyers: ask counterparties whether cargoes depend on Yanbu, which adds Bab al-Mandab risk4.
08Sources
  1. Gulf workarounds fail to replace Hormuz as oil flows plunge despite pipelines and alternative routes. Ynet, April 5th, 2026
  2. The Middle East and Global Energy Markets. International Energy Agency, November 8th, 2026
  3. Oil exporters scramble for routes beyond Hormuz, but there are no easy options. CNBC, April 23rd, 2026
  4. The Day After Hormuz: Can the Gulf Free Itself from the Chokepoint? Institute for National Security Studies, September 16th, 2026
  5. Why Energy Security Is Beating Energy Ideology. Shale magazine, November 4th, 2026
  6. The State of the Strait: The Role of Hormuz in the Middle East War So Far. International Crisis Group, June 2nd, 2026
  7. World's energy supply buffers have been eroded, ADNOC CEO says. Reuters, November 2nd, 2026