United StatesOffice of Foreign Assets Control
US Treasury sanctions officeSettled with Extreme for $1,529,685 and with Pegasus for $175,015.2,4
What to watch
- Whether its next release names an acquired business as a cause
Extreme's OFAC settlement against the legal ceiling for nine violations
Sources: diaztradelaw.com, October 29th, 20261; ofac.treasury.gov, October 27th, 20262
Extreme Networks, a North Carolina networking company, agreed on October 27th, 2026 to pay $1,529,685 in a sanctions case.2 The settlement is with the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the US Treasury office that enforces economic sanctions.3 The case covers nine exports between September 2018 and March 2022 to MMZA, a Russian defense manufacturer that OFAC treats as blocked.2 A listed Russian state-owned defense group, Almaz Antey, owned most of MMZA.2
The customer arrived with a purchase. In March 2018 Extreme's Russian subsidiary bought customer accounts and contracts from another Russian networking business. One contract named MMZA as an end user.1 OFAC says Extreme's US compliance team reviewed that agreement and did not recognize that MMZA was blocked.1 MMZA went on the US sanctions list under its own name on June 28th, 2022.1
A second October case shows the same blind spot with no acquisition. On October 9th, 2026 OFAC announced a $175,015 settlement with Pegasus Worldwide Logistics, a California freight forwarder.4 Pegasus checked a renamed supplier by its new name only.5 Both cases turn on a check that matched a label and missed the party behind it. Acquired contracts are one route to that error, not the only one.
Extreme Networks sells cloud networking products from its base in North Carolina.2 OFAC announced its settlement on October 27th, 2026.2 It resolved nine apparent violations of the Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions Regulations.1
OFAC found the violations egregious and voluntarily self-disclosed.2 Under its enforcement guidelines that pairing sets the base penalty at one-half of the statutory maximum, which is $1,699,650.1 The settlement came in at $1,529,685.1
US dollars
Source: diaztradelaw.com, October 29th, 20261
Net to Treasury is the settlement less $487,861 deemed satisfied by payments to the Justice Department.
The Justice Department (DOJ) ran a parallel criminal case. It signed a non-prosecution agreement (NPA) with Extreme, which paid criminal penalties of $975,721.84 to resolve the investigation.6 OFAC treated $487,861 of its own figure as paid through that agreement, which leaves $1,041,824 payable to Treasury.1
Zyphe, a compliance software vendor, adds the two figures and gets about $2.02 million across both agencies.7
The 50 Percent Rule explains the gap. Under it, an entity owned 50 percent or more by blocked persons is itself blocked, even when it is not on the list.7 The list in question is the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List, which names the parties US persons may not deal with.3
Almaz Antey owned most of MMZA, and OFAC therefore treats MMZA as blocked at all relevant times.2 MMZA describes itself as the sole supplier of Russia's S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air missile systems.7 A name-only screen cannot see an ownership block.7
OFAC states that Extreme's US-led compliance team reviewed the March 2018 purchase agreement. It did not do enough diligence to recognize that MMZA was blocked.1
United StatesSettled with Extreme for $1,529,685 and with Pegasus for $175,015.2,4
United StatesSigned its first near-miss non-prosecution agreement with Extreme.6
United KingdomImposed a £390,000 penalty on an Apple subsidiary on March 19th, 2026.8
Extreme's central compliance team screened each of the nine purchase orders under a policy to review all Russia dealings.1 The orders named a different Russian company, Dmitrovskiy Experimental Mechanical Plant (DEMZ), as end user.1 OFAC found that MMZA was the final recipient each time.1
DOJ adds an insider account. It says the concealment was from the company's global trade compliance group.6
certain Russia-based Extreme Networks employees concealed the identity of MMZA
justice.gov6
Both agencies credit the remediation. Extreme ended its contract with the distributor and added diligence procedures for mergers and acquisitions.6
On October 9th, 2026 OFAC announced a $175,015 settlement with Pegasus Worldwide Logistics, a California freight forwarder.4,5 OFAC cited four apparent violations of the Illicit Drug Trafficking Sanctions Regulations and six of its reporting rules.4
Pegasus arranged the import of a machine from Youli Technology Development Co., Ltd., a Chinese supplier that OFAC designated on May 30th, 2023.5 After the designation Youli changed its name, but its phone number and email address stayed on the SDN List.5 Pegasus checked only the new name and found no match.5
The machine cost $5,950.5 OFAC found the conduct non-egregious and not voluntarily disclosed.4
Pegasus bought no business, so acquired contracts do not explain both cases. What the two share is a check that matched a label and missed the party behind it.4,1
OFAC credited Extreme with a voluntary self-disclosure.2 DOJ ruled that the disclosure to its National Security Division was not timely, because it came under imminent threat of disclosure by a news publication.6 DOJ therefore called the case its first near-miss NPA under its 2026 Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy.6
A near miss means full cooperation and remediation without qualifying for a declination of prosecution.6 The counts differ too. OFAC counts nine apparent violations, and DOJ describes 11 purchase orders.2,6 Zyphe notes that neither agency reconciles the two.7
US dollars
Source: zyphe.com, October 28th, 20267
Self-disclosure set Extreme's starting point at half the statutory maximum even though OFAC judged the conduct egregious. Zyphe finds that, among comparable 2026 cases, only Extreme pairs an egregious finding with self-disclosure.7
In the United Kingdom, the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) is part of HM Treasury. On March 19th, 2026 it imposed a £390,000 penalty on Apple Distribution International Limited.8 The Irish subsidiary of Apple Inc instructed two payments totaling £635,618.75 to Okko LLC, a Russian streaming company.8 OFSI imposed no penalty on Apple Inc itself.8
Sberbank had sold Okko to JSC New Opportunities, which the UK designated on June 29th, 2022.8 OFSI found that third-party ownership tools did not identify the change of owner in time.8 It also said responsibility rests with the entity that made the payment, even when affiliates run the compliance work.8
The European Union takes a different route. Since June 2024, EU owners of non-EU entities must use best efforts to stop those entities undermining EU sanctions on Russia or Belarus.9 Extreme Russia was a foreign subsidiary of a US parent.1 The EU rule targets that structure when the parent is European.9
In Asia-Pacific the exposure is diversion. A Global Investigations Review chapter from October 23rd, 2026 says US authorities have warned of diversion to Russia through intermediaries in third countries, including China and Hong Kong.10 The chapter says managing US risk now takes diligence beyond basic list-based screening.10
The first objection comes from DOJ's own account. It puts the cause in concealment by Russia-based employees.6 A closing check alone would not by itself have stopped staff who hid the end user in later orders. Zyphe reaches the same limit: name and ownership screening assume that staff report the real customer.7
The second objection is about cost. R. Clifton Burns, senior counsel at the Washington law firm Crowell & Moring, told FreightWaves this about the 50 Percent Rule.11
The best policy if you want to sanction someone is to put them on the SDN List, but to impose on everyone to determine compliance with the 50% rule is problematic.
finance.yahoo.com11
Regulators accept some limits. OFSI said it does not necessarily expect automated systems to stop payments completed very close to a designation.8
Neither objection removes the rule. OFAC's FAQ limits it to ownership and not control, and the Extreme release applies it to a company not yet listed by name.12,2 OFAC also wrote that diligence should be comprehensive and ongoing, including when a company buys only certain assets.1 An acquirer who screens only at closing has done part of the job.
Confidence on the mechanism is high, because OFAC ties the violations to an inherited customer relationship.1 Confidence on the horizon is low, because OFAC posts releases on its own schedule and the window is short.
Analyst assessment. Each call is scored once its date passes.
OFAC posts a civil enforcement release that names weak diligence on an acquired business or a foreign subsidiary as a cause.
OFAC's 2026 civil penalties chart lists 12 or more enforcement actions for the year.
Confidence is high on the finding and medium on how far it generalizes. Several details come from law-firm and vendor summaries of OFAC's enforcement release and settlement agreement, checked against OFAC's announcement and the Justice Department release.
A buyer of customer contracts should expect OFAC to check who owns each inherited end user. It should also expect the checking to continue after closing.1
The strongest alternative reading treats Extreme as a case about insiders and a foreign subsidiary that nobody supervised, with the acquisition as the entry point. DOJ's account supports it.6 We weigh it equally on cause and give the acquired-contract reading more weight on what a buyer can do.
Some commentary frames the case around acquired contracts.3 We read it as a screening failure that an acquisition exposed.
A later OFAC release that blames an acquired customer list with no concealment by staff would strengthen our reading. A reconciliation of OFAC's nine and DOJ's 11 that moved the start of the conduct away from the 2018 purchase would weaken it.